Friday, March 14, 2014

Release and Punish

                                                                                                                                 *


Hitchcock’s Psycho shook something loose from America's popular imagination, something that fell from its perch and crawled into the shadows, and has been lurking there ever since--something heinous that his nineteen-sixties classic asks us to acknowledge. In this film, Hitchcock taunts us with the notion of the psycho and what he/she represents in relation to our moral values and visceral urges. There is one scene in particular, the parlor scene--arguably a microcosm of the larger message--in which we see an attractive couple having an innocuous conversation. The female lead, Marian, is almost lured by Norman who repeatedly changes the location of their dinner--first her room, then the office, then to the “parlor,” which suggests a romp, then a parley, then maybe just a polite conversation. It's if he can't decide what he wants. As if inside him there is something that can't make up its mind, something squirming, something to be shaken loose, released, and then punished.

On the surface, Norman’s demeanor is exceedingly sheepish, stuttering and soft-spoken. Marian by comparison is calm, confident, and self-possessed. To witness the subtext we must make ourselves aware of Hitchcock’s several references to birds throughout their exchange. Humans are said to eat like birds, get trapped like birds, scratch and claw like birds, click their tongues like birds—and, if that were not enough, behind the two actors are several birds that Norman himself has stuffed.** Two of these in particular seem to relate to our main characters. Marian’s bird is small, relaxed, and in a still pose. It also faces away from Norman’s bird. Norman’s bird, a larger bird of prey, is far from relaxed; it is poised with wings outstretched, beak open, and ready to pounce. It also faces Marian’s, so the 180° shot gives the impression that Marian's bird is vulnerable to to the imminent attack. It is almost as if behind each character we see their Greek daemon—the true representation of their inner self, the one they can never see but that always lurks. When the scene begins, Norman has just been scolded by his mother for having, in her estimation, licentious thoughts about their guest. Later we learn that Norman’s mother is in fact deceased, and thus this was an aspect of Norman’s psyche scolding the part of him that would wish to do untold things with his present company. The dynamic between the boyish Norman and the mother he claims he “wishes he could defy” portends the larger implicit theme of the film, which is that whenever lust is released it must be punished with violence. (Norman supplies both urges ultimately, but in our analysis I will speak as if he and his mother were separate.)

Upon her suggestion that he put his mother in a home, Norman tells Marion that he could never submit his mother to the “cruel eyes” of those who would house her in a mental institution. This is the only moment in which Norman becomes even slightly unhinged in front of Marian. And to understand why this happens is to begin to unravel the systemic implications of this film; it will be helpful to contrast these “cruel eyes,” which represent the eyes of societal institutions and accepted social/sexual mores against the Gaze of one who desires the Other sexually. For Norman, these two cannot exist harmoniously. Though murdered by his own hand, his mother's corpse continues to oppress Norman to the point of committing (most likely) multiple subsequent murders. Norman’s mother is connected with that first set of eyes, and here we also find the left-over values of an older generation that Hitchcock ultimately seeks to expose as having been scaffolded on uneven ground. The film was released in just the right cultural moment for Hitchcock's voice, in the  nineteen-sixties, a time when many societal norms, especially those surrounding sex, were just beginning to loosen. The film thus explores the tensions that arise as we give ourselves license to explore expanded sexual boundaries while trying to reconcile these explorations with older values.

To see just how much American culture and cinema had changed, compare Psycho for a moment with the film Meet Me In St. Louis. The latter, released just a decade and a half prior, is a celebration of established moral values. At the film’s close, Judy Garland’s character asks while staring out over the site of the World's Fair (a tribute to American exceptionalism), “They won’t ever tear it down will they?” As if to say, “All that is right and good in our culture is built to last right?” To which the family patriarch replies, “They better not!” Now return to Psycho. In it we see products of divorce, adultery, materialism, lust, and envy, all of which culminate with the on-screen murder of a naked woman in the shower. In Hitchcock’s film the patriarch is completely absent, and the distaff lineage is only present in the form of a corpse—the desiccated husk of a generational morality—which is kept in Norman’s family’s Victorian home. And just where is this Victorian vestige of bygone days? Why just up the hill from the Bate’s Motel! It's a seedy, and notably modern, counterpart to the family estate.

We are told in an earlier snippet of dialogue that “People pay who meet in hotels.” This line is out of place as Marian is only at the time considering a little travel. What are we to make of this portention? Is this character, a girl from the generation of "Meet me in St. Louis," saying that those who meet in hotels instead all get what they deserve? Maybe. This is not to say that Psycho is a morality tale. It is rather more like an “objective” reflection. Norman, despite his very name being an obvious pun on the “new norms” that society has embraced, is unable to cast off his upbringing, nor can he find comfort in his desires, and so he is led to madness. It would be a mistake to conclude that Hitchcock is preaching to us here. To do so would be to grossly oversimplify his artistic vision. What Hitchcock does with this film--despite titillating us probably for his own pleasure--is implicate us as taking part in our own psychological struggle. Hitchcock wants us to see that the psycho is not crouching somewhere in the darkness outside of our imagination; the psycho is in that darkness within our imagination. 

*It's true about the films release. Hitchcock held theaters to this in contract.
**I'll leave you to draw your own conclusions about that one.

Saturday, March 1, 2014

Merkel cells a primary factor in generating philosophical discomfort with superposed states

                                                                 Merkel Cells stained with fluorescent dye.                                 

  • P1) Over millions of years experience leads us to believe, in the same way that instinct is “learned” by a species, that two exclusive things cannot occupy the same space.
    • Endowed with foresight by the cerebral cortex, humans then develop the intuitive sense that, categorically, no two exclusive objects can occupy the same space.
  • P2) This gives rise to the broader logical concept of negation and definition by negation: thing A is not thing B.
  • P3) With the same means used to justify the Sheffer Stroke we can now explain our intuition for formal, binary, Boolean/mathematical logic provided that we can also give a historical account for the concept(s) “and” or “or.”
    • These concepts are both supplied as soon as we posit the “first ontological piece” + 1, and their appearance happens simultaneously by virtue of p2.
  • P4) Using this binary-based mathematical logic, Newton and Leibniz invent calculus and several physical sciences bloom, rendering our understanding of the natural world on a large scale.
    • Multivalent and fuzzy logic will also come eventually, but only from meta-analysis of bivalent logic.
  • P5) In the 20th Century, human beings bear witness to small things for the first time. Classical models “break down” because objects of little mass do not exhibit the same behaviors seen in macro phenomena.
  • P6) Our logical intuitions cause us to question why superposition does not adhere to the world’s “normal” behavior, or, rather, we ask why the world does not square with our intuitions.
    • At its heart superposition undermines p2 because it violates the assumptions of p1 with regard to state; p1 no longer implies that one thing does not occupy two spaces/states.
  • P7) The commensurability problem between superposition and p2 is relaxed when we consider that there is no reason that every corner of the universe (specifically quantum corners) should comply with our logical intuitions. This is because the consistent correlation between logical and mathematical truths with empirical observations has hereto been what may be called a false isomorphism—a dual succession of deductive procedures compatible between what only appears to be two systems: mathematical logic, and the world as it is subjected to empirical experimentation.
    • First there is the application of a bivalent logical postulate to the ingression of sensory data upon our physical bodies, which creates a systematic ordering of the natural world—and the creation of a mental world of order that is neither Platonic nor divine.
    • Outcomes of the manipulation of symbols within this mental realm can then be verified by experimental observations: of course. The output is the same as the input. The “second” system seems to be the physical framework of our world, but natural order and our innate logical/mathematical order are selfsame.
  • P8) The philosophical problem arises that the p7 explanation is only satisfactory if there is a cause for countenancing the “first ontological piece” through the means of logical negation. (Which really came first, p1 or p2?) In order for the isomorphic premise (p7) to eat its own tail, the process it describes must begin somewhere. In other words, there must be a reason for our first supposing that two things are separate. And this cause should be supported by at least one identifiable evolutionary/scientific beginning to be satisfactory. A sufficient case: we differentiate the separation of our bodies (about which the CNS receives a constant flow of tactile information) from the rest of the world (about which it doesn't) through the sense of touch, through integumentary nerve bundles—Merkel cells.
Therefore: Merkel cells (and other tactile PNS sensation) lead to our discomfort with superposed states and can now bring comfort to those still “touchy” about quantum phenomena.